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A key question that many have been asking in recent weeks is whether the nation can afford health reform given the very large economic problems that the U.S. currently 
faces. But we argue that we should also be asking whether 
we can afford not to enact comprehensive health reform. As 
congressional committees prepare to introduce landmark health 
reform legislation, we used a comprehensive simulation model 
to quantify the intermediate and longer-term implications if 
America’s health care system is not significantly overhauled. 
Under a range of economic scenarios, the analysis shows an 
increasing strain on business owners and their employees over 
the next decade if reform is not enacted. There would be a 
dramatic decline in numbers of people insured through their 
employers, and millions more would become uninsured. There 
would be large growth in enrollment in public programs, 
major increases in health care spending and growing levels of 
uncompensated care. While all income levels would be affected, 
middle-class working families would be hardest hit.
What We Did
We used the Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy 
Simulation Model (HIPSM), which uses national survey data  
and economic analyses of individual and business behavior,  
to examine how employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), private 
non-group coverage, and Medicaid/CHIP are likely to change 
over the next decade under three potential scenarios:
1.   Worst case—slow growth in incomes and continuing high 
growth rates for health care costs;
2.   Intermediate case—somewhat faster growth in incomes,  
but a lower growth rate for health care costs; 
3.   Best case—full employment, faster income growth, and even 
slower growth in health care costs. 
The goal was to look at trends for five and 10 years in the future, 
2014 and 2019 respectively, including:
  »  How many people will be uninsured, and how will this vary 
by family income level?
  »  How many people will have ESI, and how many will be 
eligible for public coverage?
  »  How will the increases in insurance premiums affect 
employer spending?
  »  What will happen to family spending for insurance premiums 
and out-of-pocket costs?
  »  How much will government spending for Medicaid, 
the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and 
uncompensated care increase?
Under all three scenarios, we used the same growth rates for the 
U.S. population over time, resulting in a U.S. population under 
age 65 of 276 million in 2014, and 284 million in 2019. We also 
assumed recent trends in income inequality would continue.
Executive Summary
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How Many People Will Be Uninsured?
In the worst case scenario, the number of uninsured Americans 
would increase to 57.7 million in 2014 and to 65.7 million in 
2019. In the best case, the number grows to 53.1 million in  
2014 and 57 million in 2019. All of these estimates assume that 
states would continue to maintain current eligibility levels for 
public coverage. Without this, the number of uninsured would 
be even higher. 
How Will People Be Covered?
In all three scenarios, we see a decline in ESI coverage rates.  
The rate of ESI would fall from 56.1 percent in 2009 to 49.2 
percent in 2019 in the worst case scenario, and to 53.9 percent  
in the best case. 
Middle-income individuals and families – those between  
200-399 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) – would  
be the most likely group to become uninsured over the next 
decade. Among this group, the number of uninsured would 
increase from 12.5 million in 2009 to 18.2 million in 2019 under 
the worst case scenario, and to 14.8 million in the best case.  
Even higher-income families would see sizable reductions in 
coverage. The number of uninsured in the highest income group 
increases from 5.5 million in 2009 to 9.9 million in 2019 in the 
worst case scenario, and to 7.5 million in the best case.
Lower-income individuals would see small drops in employer 
coverage and somewhat larger declines in non-group coverage, 
but we project a substantial expansion of Medicaid enrollment 
for low-income populations – resulting in the uninsured rate for 
this income group remaining relatively unchanged over the next 
decade. Because of growth in this income group, particularly in 
the worst case, the number of low-income uninsured Americans 
would increase.
Medicaid and CHIP coverage would increase substantially, 
with enrollment increasing from 16.5 percent of the population 
in 2009 to 20.3 percent in 2019 in the worst case scenario, an 
increase of 13.3 million more Americans covered under public 
programs. Even in the best case, enrollment would increase to 
18.3 of the population.
There would be little change in the coverage of children. While 
there would be a small drop in private coverage, Medicaid 
enrollment would expand by more than enough to offset 
the decline. Some children would become newly eligible for 
Medicaid due to changes in income. Also, because of rising 
out-of-pocket costs, some families whose children would have 
otherwise been uninsured would enroll them in either Medicaid 
or CHIP. Their parents and other adults, however, would not  
fare as well.
Parents would face significant declines in ESI and in non-group 
insurance. Some of this would be offset by increases in Medicaid, 
but many would instead find themselves without coverage. By 
2019, the number of uninsured parents would increase from 12.5 
million in 2009 to 17.6 million in the worst case scenario, and to 
14.5 million in the best case.
Non-parents would also fare poorly. We see particularly sharp 
drops in employer coverage and very limited gains in Medicaid 
coverage. The number of uninsured non-parents would increase 
sharply from 28.7 million in 2009 to 39.5 million in 2019 in the 
worst case scenario, and to 34.3 million in the best case. 
How Will Employer Costs Be Affected?
Under all three scenarios, there would be substantial increases  
in employer premiums for businesses of all sizes. 
We estimate that employer spending on premiums would 
increase from $429.8 billion in 2009 to $885.1 billion in 2019 in 
the worst case scenario, and to $740.6 billion in the best case. 
Spending on premiums by small firms would grow considerably 
more slowly, simply because small firms are much more likely 
to drop coverage. In contrast, large firms would see increases of 
123 percent over the 10-year period in the worst case. In the best 
case, such firms would see increases of 77 percent. 
As a consequence, premiums would increase as a share of worker 
compensation – from 9.6 percent in 2009 to 17.0 percent in 2019 
in the worst case scenario, and to 12.6 percent in the best case. 
These costs would eventually mean lower wages and incomes 
for workers, but until these adjustments are made, business 
profitability would be adversely affected.
What Will the Costs Be to All of Us?
Individual and family spending would increase significantly 
– from $326.4 billion in 2009 to $548.4 billion in 2019 in the 
worst case scenario, and to $478.2 billion in the best case. 
Medicaid and CHIP spending would grow substantially, both 
because of increased enrollment and because of higher health 
care costs. In the worst case scenario, Medicaid and CHIP 
spending for the non-elderly would increase from $251.2 billion 
in 2009 to $519.7 billion in 2019. In the best case, spending 
would increase 61.7 percent to $403.8 billion.
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The cost of uncompensated care would also increase – as 
much as 128 percent in the worst case scenario; in the best 
case, the cost of such care would increase 72 percent. Together 
with increased spending for Medicaid and CHIP, this would 
inevitably mean higher taxes. 
Another implication of the substantial increase in employer 
premiums is that federal tax revenues will be affected. 
Government will see revenue losses as employer premiums 
increase as a share of worker compensation. Employer 
contributions to premiums are not treated as taxable income – 
either for payroll or income taxes. The increases in premiums 
will mean that the cost of the tax exclusion will increase 
substantially. If marginal tax rates stay roughly constant over 
time, then the tax exclusion will increase in line with the growth 
in employer spending on premiums. 
We conclude that the nation will face rapidly accelerating costs 
for individuals, employers and government, as well as the rate of 
uninsurance, if health reform is not enacted. Our analysis shows 
that without significant reform that makes health insurance more 
accessible and affordable, and reduces the rate of health care cost 
growth over time, the number of uninsured will increase and 
health care spending will increase dramatically. 
Throughout the paper we use the term “health reform” 
generically to describe the proposed plans Congress and 
policymakers are currently formulating that would expand 
coverage and access, reduce health care costs, and improve 
quality. It is important to note that we are not endorsing 
any specific proposal currently being debated. Moreover, we 
recognize that these reform proposals would not necessarily 
resolve all the issues raised in this report. However, we do believe 
that many of the proposals would make significant inroads to 
avoid the scenarios we predict.
The cost of financing necessary expansion in public programs 
will place added burden on taxpayers. Similarly, the rising 
uncompensated cost of caring for the uninsured through safety 
net programs will add to this burden. Employers will face sharply 
increasing health care premiums. This eventually gets passed 
on to the workforce in terms of lower wages, but that does not 
happen instantaneously. In the short-term, business profitability 
is adversely affected. Finally, individuals and families will face 
higher out-of-pocket costs for premiums and for services.
But it is also true that health reform will increase health care 
expenditures – particularly in the early years. Depending  
upon cost containment success, it may remain true over a  
more substantial period of time. In the long-term, however, 
successful cost containment will slow the rate of growth in 
spending and reduce the incremental costs of expanding  
coverage at the same time. 
Health reform will change who bears the burden of financing 
the health care system and how this burden is shared – between 
employers and individuals, between direct payments and taxes, 
and across income groups. It will stem the continuous erosion 
in the number of Americans with health care coverage, decrease 
financial pressures on the hospitals and clinics that provide 
care to the uninsured, reduce many system inefficiencies, and 
ultimately improve both the health and financial security of the 
American people. While enacting health reform will be difficult 
and expensive, the cost of failure is substantial.
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This paper analyzes the intermediate and long-run implications of failure to enact health care reform. Several observers have argued in recent weeks that health 
reform is not feasible because of the serious recession, declining 
tax revenues and the ballooning federal deficit. However, in 
the absence of reform, health care costs, health insurance 
premiums, and out-of-pocket spending are likely to continue 
to grow, though perhaps initially at a slower rate because of the 
poor economy. But as the economy improves, there is reason to 
believe that health care costs, insurance premiums and out-of-
pocket spending will continue to increase at rates similar to those 
we have experienced in recent years, such as health care cost 
rising two percentage points faster than Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).1 To the extent health care costs and premiums grow faster 
than incomes, employers will be less likely to offer coverage 
and individuals will be less likely to take up coverage when 
offered. The likelihood of enrolling in non-group coverage will 
be negatively affected by rising costs, though perhaps positively 
affected by reduced access to employer-based coverage. Those 
eligible for Medicaid would be more likely to enroll due to the 
rising costs of private options and higher out-of-pocket costs. 
Medicaid and CHIP will become more attractive to those 
already eligible for the programs under current rules due to 
expected declines in employer coverage and increased out-of-
pocket costs when uninsured. Continued increases in income 
inequality will also lead to greater Medicaid enrollment. Both 
forces will increase both federal and state spending under the 
public insurance programs. Erosion of ESI and declining real 
incomes at the low end of the income distribution will also result 
in an increase in the number of uninsured, as only a fraction 
of the low-income population is eligible for public insurance. 
This will mean increases in the amount of uncompensated 
care and increased spending by state and local governments for 
those without coverage. The end result is that there are likely to 
be significant changes in the distribution of health insurance 
coverage and increases in spending, both privately and publicly. 
In this paper we use the Urban Institute’s Health Insurance 
Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) to estimate the likely changes 
in coverage and health care costs that the nation will face in the 
absence of health insurance coverage reforms. We make estimates 
under three alternative scenarios (including assumptions about 
health care costs and premium growth, unemployment, income 
growth and changes in income inequality) for 2014 and 2019 – in 
the absence of health reform – to answer the following questions:
  »  How will the level of health insurance premiums change for 
employer-sponsored insurance and for non-group coverage?
  »  How many people will have employer-sponsored insurance in 
2014 and 2019? How will this vary among children, parents 
and non-parents and by income group?
  »  How many people will obtain coverage under Medicaid given 
changes in income distribution and declines in employer 
coverage? How much will spending on public insurance (e.g., 
Medicaid and CHIP) increase? How much will government 
spending increase relative to aggregate personal incomes?
  »  What will happen to employer spending on premiums, and 
how will premiums change as a share of worker compensation?
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  »  What will happen to family spending for health insurance 
premiums and out-of-pocket costs relative to family incomes? 
How will this vary by income group?
  »  How many people will be uninsured in 2014 and 2019; how 
will this vary by family income level? Will the growth in the 
uninsured be different for children, parents and non-parents? 
How will the cost of uncompensated care change over time 
given changes in the number of the uninsured?
Throughout the paper we use the term “health reform” 
generically to describe the proposed plans Congress and 
policymakers are currently formulating that would expand 
coverage and access, reduce health care costs, and improve 
quality. It is important to note that we are not endorsing 
any specific proposal currently being debated. Moreover, we 
recognize that these reform proposals would not necessarily 
resolve all the issues raised in this report. However, we do believe 
that many of the proposals would make significant inroads to 
avoid the scenarios we predict.
Methods
This paper uses a new Urban Institute microsimulation model, 
the HIPSM. HIPSM models the behavior of business and 
individuals in their decisions to offer and take up coverage. 
The model is designed to show the impact of policy changes 
(e.g., subsidies for the purchase of private coverage or public 
program expansions) on firms’ decisions to offer coverage, 
individuals’ decisions to leave current private coverage and enroll 
in Medicaid, and decisions by the uninsured to take up new 
coverage when eligible. In this analysis we test “doing nothing” 
as a policy option and examine how the continuation of various 
trends will change the status quo.
The model uses data from several national data sets: the March 
2005 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement, the February 2005 CPS Contingent 
Work and Alternative Employment Supplement, the 2002–2004 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), the 2004 Statistics  
of Income (SOI) Public Use Tax File) and the 2004 Statistics  
of U.S. Business. Health expenditures, health insurance  
and health conditions variables were taken from a pooled  
2002–2004 MEPS data set and statistically matched to the  
core CPS file by common characteristics in the two data sets. 
After matching, health expenditures were adjusted to match 
aggregate benchmarks from a reconciliation of total spending 
from the MEPS and the National Health Expenditure  
Accounts, inflated to 2004.2
The model includes a detailed eligibility simulation for 
Medicaid that incorporates the most important eligibility rules 
for each state. The eligibility model takes into account family 
composition, adult work status, earned and unearned income, 
assets, child care expenses, work expenses, citizenship status 
and state of residency, and compares these components to state- 
specific information on Medicaid eligibility requirements. 
In the model, we also adjust for the undercount of Medicaid on 
the CPS. It is widely believed that the CPS misses large numbers 
of people who are enrolled in the program. Our analysis has 
convinced us that some adjustment needs to be made. But, fully 
adjusting to state administrative records would lead to too large 
of an adjustment in many states. In some cases, we would have 
many more children enrolled in Medicaid than we estimate to 
be eligible. There is no perfect solution to this problem. We 
assume that neither the CPS, nor administrative data are fully 
accurate, and thus increase Medicaid numbers by 50 percent of 
the difference between those reported on the CPS and Medicaid 
administrative data. The Medicaid undercount adjustment 
results in an increase of 3 million individuals on Medicaid and a 
reduction of 1 million in the number of uninsured.
The HIPSM behavioral modules represent individual and family 
demand for health insurance coverage through a “utility-based” 
approach in which each individual is assigned a utility value 
that measures the relative desirability of each health insurance 
option. These utilities then shape decisions when reform options 
are introduced. Among individuals, families and employers, the 
responsiveness of health insurance decisions to changes in health 
insurance options and premiums are also calibrated in HIPSM to 
findings in the empirical economics literature. For example, we 
establish targets for (1) take up rates for Medicaid/CHIP coverage 
of newly eligible individuals, (2) ESI premium elasticities of take 
up conditional on firms offering, (3) firm premium elasticities 
of offering coverage and (4) non-group premium elasticities. We 
then calibrate the behavioral responses for individuals and firms 
in the model so as to meet our targets. All of these targets are 
within reasonable ranges as set forth by Glied, Remler, and Graff 
Zivin.3 Once we obtain behavioral responses consistent with 
our targets, they remain fixed across the simulations of different 
reform scenarios.
Of particular importance to this study is the effect of increasing 
private health insurance premiums and health care costs on the 
number of uninsured. The behavioral responses in HIPSM line 
up well with available evidence. We converted the findings of 
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two econometric studies of the effects of premium increases on 
the number of uninsured into comparable elasticity estimates, 
specifically, the overall percent change in the uninsured rate 
due to a percent change in private health care premiums.4 The 
findings of Gilmer and Kronick, who used data from 1987 to 
2002, show an overall elasticity of 0.49.5 The results of Chernew, 
Cutler and Keenan, who used data centered around the period 
from 1990 to 1999, show an elasticity of 0.33.6 A look at recent 
historical experience would suggest a somewhat smaller effect. A 
report by the State Health Access Data Assistance Center shows 
that, in constant dollars, the average total single ESI premiums 
increased 61 percent from 1996 to 2006, while family premiums 
increased 79 percent.7 Over about the same period, median 
income for full-time workers increased 10 percent. The uninsured 
rate increased from 16.0 to 17.5 percent of the non-elderly 
population—a 9.3 percent increase in the rate. While recognizing 
that other factors may also be at work, this would suggest an 
elasticity of the uninsured rate to private premiums (in excess of 
income growth) of around 0.15. Medicaid and CHIP expansions 
since the late 1990s may have lessened the extent to which those 
losing private coverage become uninsured in more recent years. 
Given the growth assumptions in this study, the behavioral 
effects within HIPSM result in overall elasticities ranging from 
0.24 to 0.31, which are close to the Chernew et al. estimate and 
between the other two estimates.8
HIPSM allows transitions from each coverage type in the 
baseline to any coverage type in reform, with the exception of 
Medicare and other public coverage for which transitions are 
limited. In response to reforms, some uninsured individuals in 
the baseline may obtain ESI or public coverage in reform, even as 
others with ESI or public coverage in baseline become uninsured. 
In the tables below, we present the net changes in coverage.
We analyze the implications of the failure to enact health reform 
by assuming that certain trends continue. The key change is 
the increase in health care costs (and insurance premiums) 
relative to incomes. Increases in premiums cause employers 
to change decisions about offering coverage, and workers to 
change decisions about taking up offers. This reduces the 
number of people with employer-based coverage. We make 
alternative assumptions about the growth in health care costs 
and premiums. We also make alternative assumptions about 
average income growth. Reflecting long-standing trends, we 
assume in all of the simulations that income inequality will 
continue to increase over time, that is, higher-income people 
experience faster income growth than lower-income people. 
Finally, we make alternative assumptions about the changes in 
unemployment rates and ESI offer rates over the next 10 years. 
We make estimates of changes in coverage and costs between 
2009 and 2014, and between 2014 and 2019. Since the model as 
noted above is based on 2004 data, we need to develop a 2009 
baseline. We do this by first growing the data from 2004 to 
2007 given actual changes in coverage and population growth 
between 2004 and 2007, as measured by the CPS. In this step, we 
apply growth rates by cells based on family income as a percent 
of the FPL and insurance coverage. Then, to reflect worsening 
economic conditions between 2007 and 2009, we apply estimates 
from Holahan and Garrett to estimate the impact of higher 
unemployment rates on changes in employer coverage, public 
coverage, non-group coverage and the uninsured over that 
period.9 We assume that the unemployment rate will average 
9.0 percent in 2009. This is consistent with forecasts from the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Blue Chip (a consensus 
of 50 private forecasters) and Economy.com.10 We make further 
adjustments to ensure consistency with Census estimates of 
population growth, by age and gender cell, from 2004 to 2009.11 
We show the result of our procedure for growing the data from 
2007 to 2009 on the overall coverage distribution in Table 1. 
The overall population under age 65 grows from 263 million 
in 2007 to nearly 268 million in 2009. Reflecting the effects of 
rising unemployment, the share of people with ESI falls from 
59.2 percent in 2007 to an estimated 56.1 percent in 2009. The 
share with Medicaid or CHIP coverage increases from 40.3 to 
44.1 million. The number of uninsured rises from 44.4 million 
(16.9 percent) in 2007 to 49.1 million (18.4 percent) in 2009, our 
baseline year. 
2007 % 2009 %
ESI 155.6 59.2% 150.0 56.1%
Non-Group 14.2 5.4% 15.8 5.9%
Medicaid 40.3 15.3% 44.1 16.5%
Medicare 4.5 1.7% 4.5 1.7%
Other 4.0 1.5% 4.0 1.5%
Uninsured 44.4 16.9% 49.1 18.4%
Total 262.9 100.0% 267.6 100.0%
Table 1: Changes in Coverage From 2007 to 2009 
Total Non-Elderly Population (in millions)
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Tabulations of the 2008 CPS show 45 million non-elderly 
uninsured in 2007.12 We begin with 44.4 million in 2007, because 
of the Medicaid undercount adjustment and our procedures for 
aging from 2004. In making our 2009 estimate, we note that in 
2007, the unemployment rate was 4.6 percent. Assuming a 9.0 
percent unemployment rate in 2009 and using the estimates from 
Holahan and Garrett,13 we would add 4.8 million uninsured. 
Because some of the effect of unemployment on coverage 
operates with a lag, we discount the 4.8 million to 4.0 million. 
This brings us to 48.4 million. Population growth brings the 
total to 49.1 million uninsured in 2009.
In implementing the growth rate assumptions we make beyond 
2009 within HIPSM, we use the model to generate behavioral 
responses to the cumulative amount of health care cost growth, 
net of income growth, that is assumed to occur between 2009 
and 2014. This rise in the relative price of health care and 
health insurance premiums is modeled as a “reform” within 
the baseline year. As private health insurance premiums rise, 
coverage becomes less affordable and demand falls. Fewer firms 
offer coverage and fewer workers take up their ESI offers. Fewer 
individuals purchase non-group coverage. Those who are eligible 
for Medicaid or CHIP become more likely to enroll. More 
people become uninsured. Given these behavioral responses, we 
then age the population to 2014 and 2019 by making adjustments 
to the weights of the observations in the HIPSM output file. The 
reweighting adjustments take into account the assumptions for 
changes in employment, incomes, offer rates and changes in the 
population by age and gender cells. 
The Three Alternative Scenarios
We use three alternative scenarios to project changes in coverage 
and health care costs between 2009 and 2014. These are based 
on a series of assumptions that are shown in the top section of 
Table 2. The worst case assumes that unemployment rates do not 
return to full employment levels (a rate of 7.1 percent in 2014), 
that income growth is slow, and that health care costs will grow 
somewhat faster than projected by Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) actuaries.14 We also assume that firm 
offer rates trend lower, a factor seen in the earlier recession in this 
decade (this has the effect of lowering employer coverage).15 The 
best case assumes that unemployment rates return to 5.1 percent, 
that income growth is faster, that health care costs grow at slower 
rates (consistent with the projections of CMS actuaries), and 
that there is no additional negative trend in firm offer rates. The 
intermediate case assumes that unemployment rates continue to 
be relatively high (6.1 percent), and that incomes and health care 
costs grow at rates between the worst and best case. 
We make a similar set of assumptions between 2014 and 2019. 
We assume that the unemployment rate stays at 5.1 percent over 
the period; this is slightly higher than CBO projects but lower 
than the Blue Chip forecast.16 We also assume that health care 
costs grow in line with projections of the CMS actuaries, but 
assume slightly faster growth in the worst case and slower growth 
in the best case.17 We assume that overall income grows at 
slightly faster rates than we assumed for 2009 through 2014.  
In the following, we discuss each of these assumptions.
Unemploy-
ment rate 
at end of 
period 
Employment 







































rate due to 
recession
2009 to 2014
Scenario 1 (Worst): 7.1% 61.2% 1.0% 2.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 3.5% Yes
Scenario 2 (Intermediate): 6.1 62.0 1.5 2.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 3.0 Yes
Scenario 3 (Best): 5.1 62.8 2.0 2.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 2.5 No
2014 to 2019
Scenario 1 (Worst): 5.1 62.8 1.5 2.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 3.5 No
Scenario 2 (Intermediate): 5.1 62.8 2.0 2.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 3.0 No
Scenario 3 (Best): 5.1 62.8 2.5 2.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 2.5 No
Table 2: Growth Rate Assumptions Under Each of Three Scenarios, By Five-Year Period
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Unemployment/Employment — In the worst case, we assume that 
in 2014 the unemployment rate is 7.1 percent, and that 61.2 
percent of the working-age population is employed. This is a 
slightly higher rate of unemployment for 2014 than we see in 
various forecasts and assumes that the economy does not recover 
as rapidly as expected. The Blue Chip forecasters project that 
the unemployment rate will be 9.1 percent in 2010, 8.1 percent 
in 2011, and fall to 6.3 percent in 2014.18 This is somewhat 
more optimistic than our assumption of 7.1 percent. CBO has 
a lower unemployment rate assumption of 5.1 percent in 2014. 
Economy.com assumes an average unemployment rate of 9.0 
percent in 2009, which falls to about 5.1 percent in 2014.19 In 
the intermediate case, we assume an unemployment rate of 
6.1 percent. In our best case scenario, the unemployment rate 
returns to 5.1 percent in 2014. This is in line with two of the 
three forecasts. Between 2014 and 2019 we assume that the 
unemployment rate stays at 5.1 percent throughout the period, 
consistent with all three forecasts.
We estimate what the associated employment to population 
ratio would be under each assumed unemployment rate. For 
2008, the overall unemployment rate was 5.8 percent, while the 
employment to (working age) population ratio was 62.2 percent. 
Using simple regression methods on data from 1990 to 2008, we 
find that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate 
is associated approximately with a 0.8 percentage point change 
in the employment-to-population ratio.20 Thus we project the 
employment to population ratio would be 61.2 percent if the 
unemployment rate were 7.1 percent, and 62.8 percent if the 
unemployment rate were 5.1 percent. 
Income Per Capita — We assume that per capita incomes would 
grow by 1.5 percent overall in the intermediate case between 
2009 and 2014. We assume income growth would average 1.0 
and 2.0 percent in the worst and best cases respectively. From 
2014 to 2019, we assume incomes grow by 2.0 percent on 
average in the intermediate case, and by 1.5 and 2.5 percent in 
the intermediate and best cases respectively. These assumptions 
bound the forecasts made by Economy.com, which projected that 
per capita income would grow by 2.0 percent between 2009 and 
2014, and by 1.5 percent between 2014 and 2019. Recent CBO 
economic projections do not provide forecasts for per capita 
income growth.21 
Between 2009 and 2014, we are assuming slower growth in 
incomes than the Economy.com forecasts, except in the best 
case. This reflects our assumption that the effects of the 
economic downturn might be felt longer than Economy.com 
and CBO are forecasting. It is consistent with the view that the 
federal budget deficit will result in higher real interest rates and 
that higher tax rates will probably be needed to bring down the 
federal deficit. These are likely to slow the rate of economic 
growth. Between 2014 and 2019, we assume that per capita 
income will grow at rates equal to those forecasted by Economy.
com in the worse case, but somewhat higher between 2014 and 
2019; the latter is consistent with full economic recovery and 
somewhat greater increases in incomes than in the forecasts. 
Income Inequality — We also make assumptions about changes in 
income inequality. This is based on our analysis of data from the 
CPS between 2000 and 2007 (see Table 3). During this period, per 
capita family incomes grew at 2.5 per year overall. Those in the 
top 20 percent of the distribution of family income (excluding 
the top 2 percent, because of problems with measuring income 
at the highest levels) had average income growth of 2.7 percent. 
Because of likely faster growth among the highest-income people 
who were excluded, average income growth for the full top 20 
percent was probably even higher than 2.7 percent. The fourth 
income quintile grew at 2.5 percent; thus the top 40 percent of 
the income distribution had somewhat faster income growth 
than the average. The middle income group grew at 2 percent per 
year, the second quintile by 1.4 percent, and the lowest income 
quintile experienced a decline in income of 0.6 percent.22 
In the future income growth scenarios, we assume these 
differences in growth by income quintile will continue, but 
overall average income growth varies across scenarios as shown 
in columns 2 through 5 of Table 3. Thus, for the 1 percent 





By target rate of average annual income growth
Overall average 2.47% 1.00% 1.50% 2.00% 2.50%
Quintile of family income
1 (lowest) -0.59% -2.06% -1.56% -1.06% -0.56%
2 1.44% -0.03% 0.47% 0.97% 1.47%
3 1.95% 0.48% 0.98% 1.48% 1.98%
4 2.46% 0.99% 1.49% 1.99% 2.49%
5 (highest) 2.71% 1.24% 1.74% 2.24% 2.74%
Table 3: Actual And Assumed Annual Income Growth 
Rates, By Quintiles of Family Income
Health Reform: The Cost of Failure
9
income quintile would have income growth of 1.2 percent, the 
second highest 1 percent, and the third highest 0.5 percent. The 
second income quintile would have no income growth, and the 
bottom quintile would experience a 2 percent decline in income. 
This is consistent with the CPS showing growth of the lowest 
income quintile that is approximately 3 percentage points below 
the average. The other income growth scenarios show the same 
differences across income quintiles, with the levels of growth 
shifted to achieve specified levels of average income growth 
across the full population. Not only are these assumptions 
consistent with the recent changes in income inequality shown 
in the CPS, they are also consistent with longer term changes 
in economic inequality that have been observed by Yellen and 
others.23 These authors cite increasing returns to education and 
other skills brought on by skills-biased technological change, as 
well as outsourcing and immigration that depress earnings for 
middle- and lower-income families, as important explanations 
for increasing economic inequality. Some have speculated that 
the current recession could ultimately reduce income inequality, 
although so far, lower income groups appear to be the hardest 
hit.24 We examine the separate effect of the income inequality 
assumption in a sensitivity analysis.
The Consumer Price Index — Next, we make assumptions about 
growth in the consumer price index (CPI). In the modeling, we 
use the CPI to inflate federal poverty thresholds over time, as 
they are updated each year. Economy.com projects that the CPI 
would grow by 1.95 percent annually between 2009 and 2014, 
and by 2.15 percent between 2014 and 2019.25 Other forecasts, 
such as the Blue Chip forecast, assume CPI growth of about 
2 percent annually between 2009 and 2014, and 2.5 percent 
between 2014 and 2019.26 In this model, we follow the Economy.
com forecast that assumes relatively constant CPI growth. Thus 
we assume inflation of 2 percent per year between 2009 and 2014 
as well as between 2014 and 2019. This is somewhat below CPI 
increases seen in the past decade (2.8 percent); lower inflation is 
consistent with expectations of slower economic growth.27
Health Care Costs — We assume growth in private per capita 
health care costs of 7.0 percent in the worst case, 6.0 percent in 
the intermediate and 5.0 percent in the best case in both periods. 
The assumptions are generally based on projections by the CMS 
actuaries.28 The worst and intermediate cases assume faster 
growth in health care costs than the actuaries forecast. This 
reflects the evidence that health care costs seem to be relatively 
insensitive to underlying economic conditions, as they were in 
the 2000–2003 period, and continue to grow at rates observed  
in the recent past. Between 2009 and 2014, the best case 
scenarios assume that health care costs slow and increase  
by only 5.0 percent per year, consistent with the CMS actuaries 
and still faster than projected GDP growth.29 CMS actuaries 
project that health care costs will grow faster, about 6.0 percent 
per year, between 2014 and 2019 as the economy improves.  
Thus, we assume 6.0 percent per year growth in the intermediate 
case. We use 7.0 percent for the worst case, and 5.0 percent for 
the best case.
In the intermediate and worst cases, we assume that premiums 
will grow 1 percentage point faster than health care cost growth. 
This is based on the historic relationship between growth in 
health care premiums and health care costs.30 In the period of 
relatively slow growth in private health care costs in the mid-
1990s, however, premiums grew at nearly the same rate as health 
care costs. Therefore in the best case, we assume premiums will 
grow at the same 5 percent rate as private per capita health care 
costs. We assume that Medicaid spending will grow 1 percentage 
point slower per year than private health care spending. This is 
again consistent with historical trends.31 We assume that out-of-
pocket health care costs per capita grow at half the rate of private 
health care costs, following the historical pattern in CMS data 
since 1990.
Employer Offer Rates — We assume that firm offer rates of 
ESI will decline between 2009 and 2014 in our worst and 
intermediate cases, by more than is already accounted for by 
the model due to health care costs rising faster than incomes. 
Clemans-Cope and Garrett reported that firm ESI sponsorship 
rates fell from 86.5 percent in 2001 to 84.2 percent in 2005 
for employees overall (2.7 percent change) in the wake of the 
economic downturn earlier in this decade.32 The declines in ESI 
sponsorship were much steeper for low-income workers (<100 
percent of FPL), whose sponsorship rates fell from 61.1 percent in 
2001 to 55.4 percent in 2005 (a 9.3 percent change). Sponsorship 
for higher-income workers fell only slightly from 93.6 percent in 
2001 to 92.6 percent in 2005.
Following a similar pattern, here we assume that over the five-
year period from 2009 to 2014, family ESI offer rates will fall by 
a cumulative 8.0 percent for those in the lowest family income 
quintile, 6.0 percent in the second, 4.0 percent in the third, 2.0 
percent in the fourth and 1.0 percent for those in the highest 
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quintile of family income. We convert these assumed trends 
into annual growth rates, which we report in Table 4. We do not 
apply this offer rate decline due to the economic downturn in 
the best case scenario from 2009 to 2014, nor do we assume any 
additional decline in offer rates after 2014 beyond the model’s 
behavioral effects in response to health care costs rising faster 
than incomes. 
Results: Coverage
Table 5 presents the results for the changes in each type of 
coverage between 2009 and 2019 for all three scenarios. Recall 
that the worst case assumes continued high unemployment and 
slow income growth together with rapid health care cost growth, 
and that the best case assumes an improved economy with lower 
unemployment and faster wage growth together with slower 
growth in health care costs. The intermediate case generally 
makes assumptions in between the worst and best cases. In the 
worst case, employer coverage falls sharply, from 56.1 percent of 
the 2009 non-elderly population to 52.7 percent in 2014 and 49.2 
percent in 2019. The number of people with employer coverage 
falls from 150.0 million to 145.2 in 2014 and 139.4 in 2019 
(Figure 1). Non-group coverage falls as well, from 5.9 percent in 
2009 to 4.3 percent in 2019. Medicaid enrollment, on the other 
hand, increases sharply. Many of those losing ESI, and some of 
those who cannot afford to maintain non-group coverage and 
who are eligible for Medicaid, enroll in the program. Medicaid 
enrollees increase from 44.1 million in 2009 to 51.2 million in 
2014 and 57.4 million in 2019. As a percentage of the population, 
Medicaid increases from 16.5 percent in 2009 to 18.6 percent 
in 2014 and 20.3 percent in 2019. Medicare and other coverage 
(veterans, other federal programs) increase with population 
growth. The number of uninsured increases from 49.1 million 
in 2009 to 57.7 million in 2014 and 65.7 million in 2019. This 
represents an increase from 18.4 percent in 2009 to 23.2 percent 
in 2019.
As a sensitivity analysis we re-ran the worst case assuming no 
increase in income inequality, but using the same average income 
growth rates as reported in Table 2. The number of uninsured 
in 2019 increases to 64.7 million rather than 65.7 million, and 
the number with Medicaid increases to 53.3 million rather 
than 57.4 million. Thus, even without the income inequality 
growth assumption, there would be a large increase in the 
number of uninsured. The larger impact of increased inequality 
is to increase the number of people who fall below Medicaid 
eligibility thresholds and thereby increase enrollment. We also 
examined a version of the worst case scenario in 2014 without the 
firm offer rate assumption and obtained similar results as those 
reported above, but with a slightly smaller reduction in ESI. 
In the intermediate case, employer coverage declines as well, 
but not as sharply because of slower premium growth and better 
economic conditions, from 150.0 million in 2009 to 148.1 
million in 2014 and 145.7 million in 2019. As a share of the 
overall population, employer-sponsored insurance declines from 
56.1 percent in 2009 to 53.7 percent in 2014 and 51.4 percent in 
2019. Non-group coverage falls from 5.9 to 4.2 percent in 2019. 
Medicaid again increases sharply as many of those losing private 
coverage enroll in Medicaid. Medicaid increases from 44.1 
million in 2009 (16.5 percent) to 49.7 million (18.0 percent), to 
54.9 million (19.3 percent). The number of uninsured increases 
from 49.1 million in 2009 to 56.2 million in 2014 and 62.2 
million in 2019. This is an increase from 18.4 percent of the 
population in 2009 to 21.9 percent in 2019. 
In the best case scenario, employer coverage continues to decline 
as a percentage of the population from 56.1 percent in 2009 to 
55.1 percent in 2014 and 53.9 percent in 2019. The decline is less 
than under the other scenarios because of higher employment, 
faster income growth, and lower growth in health care costs. 
Because of population growth, employer coverage actually 
Changes in Cover ge, 2 09-2019 

































Quintile of family income
1 
(lowest) 2 3 4
5 
(highest)
Annual growth rate -1.65% -1.23% -0.81% -0.40% -0.20%
Table 4: Changes In Family ESI Offer Growth Rates, 
By Quintiles of Family Income
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increases by slightly more than 3 million individuals. Non-
group coverage falls, but not as much as in the other scenarios. 
Medicaid continues to increase but more slowly — from 44.1 
million in 2009 to 48.3 million in 2014 and 51.9 million in 2019. 
Medicaid grows from 16.5 percent of the population in 2009 to 
18.3 percent in 2019. The uninsured increase from 49.1 million 
(18.4 percent) to 53.1 million (19.3 percent) in 2014 and 57.0 
million (20.1 percent) in 2019.33
Results: Changes in Coverage by Age Group 
We examine coverage changes separately for children, parents 
and non-parents in Table 6.
Children — Children lose employer-sponsored insurance and 
non-group in each scenario, but their losses of private coverage 
are offset by increases in Medicaid and CHIP (Figure 2). More 
children become eligible for Medicaid/CHIP when incomes 
grow more slowly than the CPI. Also, increases in out-of-pocket 
costs cause more families to enroll their children in the public 
insurance programs. In other words, the rising cost of medical 
care makes it more expensive to keep children uninsured, 
and those with public coverage available to their children are 
therefore more likely to take advantage of it. As a result, the 
share of children who are uninsured is unchanged or falls 
slightly in all three scenarios. In the worst case scenario, the 
share of children with employer-sponsored insurance falls from 
49.1 percent in 2009 to 45.5 percent in 2014 and 42.2 percent 
in 2019. Non-group coverage falls considerably as well, but 
Medicaid/CHIP expands from covering 35.1 percent of children 
in 2009 to 42.6 percent by 2019. In absolute numbers, Medicaid 
coverage increases from 27.8 million in 2009 to 32.3 million 
in 2014 and 36.3 million in 2019. The number of uninsured 
children increases between 2009 and 2019, though the share 
without coverage is unchanged. In part this reflects the growth 
in the number of low-income children. It also reflects increased 
2009 2014 2019
N % N % N %
Worst Case
ESI 150.0 56.1% 145.2 52.7% 139.4 49.2%
Non-Group 15.8 5.9% 12.8 4.7% 12.2 4.3%
Medicaid 44.1 16.5% 51.2 18.6% 57.4 20.3%
Medicare 4.5 1.7% 4.6 1.7% 4.6 1.6%
Other 4.0 1.5% 4.2 1.5% 4.3 1.5%
Uninsured 49.1 18.4% 57.7 20.9% 65.7 23.2%
Total 267.6 100.0% 275.7 100.0% 283.6 100.0%
Intermediate Case
ESI 150.0 56.1% 148.1 53.7% 145.7 51.4%
Non-Group 15.8 5.9% 13.1 4.7% 12.0 4.2%
Medicaid 44.1 16.5% 49.7 18.0% 54.9 19.3%
Medicare 4.5 1.7% 4.5 1.6% 4.5 1.6%
Other 4.0 1.5% 4.2 1.5% 4.3 1.5%
Uninsured 49.1 18.4% 56.2 20.4% 62.2 21.9%
Total 267.6 100.0% 275.7 100.0% 283.6 100.0%
Best Case
ESI 150.0 56.1% 151.9 55.1% 153.0 53.9%
Non-Group 15.8 5.9% 13.8 5.0% 13.0 4.6%
Medicaid 44.1 16.5% 48.3 17.5% 51.9 18.3%
Medicare 4.5 1.7% 4.5 1.6% 4.5 1.6%
Other 4.0 1.5% 4.1 1.5% 4.3 1.5%
Uninsured 49.1 18.4% 53.1 19.3% 57.0 20.1%
Total 267.6 100.0% 275.7 100.0% 283.6 100.0%
Source: Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model.
Table 5: Results: Changes in Coverage Across Years Total Non-Elderly Population (in millions)
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ESI Non-Group Medicaid Medicare Other Uninsured Total
N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
Baseline
2009
Children 38.9 49.1% 3.4 4.3% 27.8 35.1% 0.2 0.3% 0.9 1.2% 7.9 10.0% 79.3 100%
Parent 45.0 64.8% 3.5 5.0% 7.0 10.1% 0.5 0.8% 0.9 1.3% 12.5 18.0% 69.4 100%
Non-Parent 66.1 55.6% 8.9 7.5% 9.3 7.8% 3.7 3.1% 2.2 1.8% 28.7 24.1% 118.8 100%
Total 150.0 56.1% 15.8 5.9% 44.1 16.5% 4.5 1.7% 4.0 1.5% 49.1 18.4% 267.6 100%
Worst Case
2014
Children 37.3 45.5% 3.1 3.8% 32.3 39.4% 0.2 0.3% 0.9 1.1% 8.1 9.9% 82.0 100%
Parent 44.3 60.9% 3.1 4.3% 8.4 11.5% 0.6 0.8% 1.0 1.3% 15.5 21.3% 72.9 100%
Non-Parent 63.6 52.6% 6.6 5.5% 10.5 8.7% 3.8 3.1% 2.3 1.9% 34.1 28.2% 120.9 100%
Total 145.2 52.7% 12.8 4.7% 51.2 18.6% 4.6 1.7% 4.2 1.5% 57.7 20.9% 275.7 100%
2019
Children 36.0 42.2% 3.2 3.7% 36.3 42.6% 0.3 0.3% 1.0 1.1% 8.5 10.0% 85.2 100%
Parent 42.6 57.0% 3.3 4.5% 9.6 12.9% 0.6 0.8% 1.0 1.3% 17.6 23.5% 74.8 100%
Non-Parent 60.9 49.2% 5.7 4.6% 11.5 9.3% 3.8 3.1% 2.3 1.9% 39.5 32.0% 123.7 100%
Total 139.4 49.2% 12.2 4.3% 57.4 20.3% 4.6 1.6% 4.3 1.5% 65.7 23.2% 283.6 100%
Intermediate Case
2014
Children 38.1 46.5% 3.1 3.8% 31.4 38.3% 0.2 0.3% 0.9 1.1% 8.2 10.0% 81.9 100%
Parent 45.0 62.0% 3.1 4.2% 8.1 11.1% 0.6 0.8% 1.0 1.3% 15.0 20.6% 72.6 100%
Non-Parent 65.0 53.6% 6.9 5.7% 10.3 8.5% 3.7 3.1% 2.3 1.9% 33.0 27.3% 121.2 100%
Total 148.1 53.7% 13.1 4.7% 49.7 18.0% 4.5 1.6% 4.2 1.5% 56.2 20.4% 275.7 100%
2019
Children 37.6 44.1% 3.1 3.6% 34.8 40.8% 0.3 0.3% 1.0 1.1% 8.5 10.0% 85.2 100%
Parent 44.2 59.4% 3.1 4.1% 9.1 12.2% 0.6 0.8% 1.0 1.3% 16.5 22.2% 74.5 100%
Non-Parent 63.9 51.6% 5.8 4.7% 11.0 8.9% 3.7 3.0% 2.3 1.9% 37.2 30.0% 124.0 100%
Total 145.7 51.4% 12.0 4.2% 54.9 19.3% 4.5 1.6% 4.3 1.5% 62.2 21.9% 283.6 100%
Best Case
2014
Children 39.1 47.7% 3.2 3.9% 30.5 37.3% 0.2 0.3% 0.9 1.1% 7.9 9.7% 81.9 100%
Parent 45.4 63.7% 3.1 4.3% 7.7 10.8% 0.6 0.8% 0.9 1.3% 13.6 19.1% 71.4 100%
Non-Parent 67.3 55.0% 7.5 6.1% 10.1 8.2% 3.7 3.1% 2.3 1.8% 31.6 25.8% 122.5 100%
Total 151.9 55.1% 13.8 5.0% 48.3 17.5% 4.5 1.6% 4.1 1.5% 53.1 19.3% 275.7 100%
2019
Children 39.5 46.4% 3.2 3.8% 33.0 38.7% 0.3 0.3% 1.0 1.1% 8.2 9.6% 85.2 100%
Parent 45.5 62.4% 3.0 4.2% 8.4 11.5% 0.6 0.8% 1.0 1.3% 14.5 19.8% 73.0 100%
Non-Parent 67.9 54.1% 6.8 5.4% 10.5 8.3% 3.7 2.9% 2.3 1.9% 34.3 27.3% 125.5 100%
Total 153.0 53.9% 13.0 4.6% 51.9 18.3% 4.5 1.6% 4.3 1.5% 57.0 20.1% 283.6 100%
Source: Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model.
Table 6: Changes in Coverage Across Years Non-Elderly Population by Children, Parents and Non-Parents (in millions)
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participation among Medicaid-eligible children in response to 
higher out-of-pocket health care costs.
In the intermediate case, employer-sponsored insurance also 
falls, but not by as much. Employer-sponsored insurance falls 
from 49.1 percent of children with ESI in 2009 to 46.5 percent in 
2014 and 44.1 percent in 2019. Medicaid grows from 35.1 percent 
in 2009 to 38.3 percent in 2014 and 40.8 percent in 2019. The 
number of children on Medicaid increases from 27.8 million 
in 2009 to 31.4 million in 2014 and 34.8 million in 2019. The 
number of uninsured children increases slightly, though the 
share of children without coverage is unchanged.
In the best case, the rate of employer-sponsored insurance still 
falls, but by substantially less. Because of population growth, in 
absolute numbers, there are slightly more children with ESI in 
2019 than in 2009. Because so many of the children with private 
coverage are low income, Medicaid still expands significantly in 
this scenario. The number of children on Medicaid grows from 
27.8 million in 2009 to 30.5 million in 2014 and 33.0 million in 
2019. As a share of the population, Medicaid grows from 35.1 to 
38.7 percent in 2019. Again, there is little change in the number 
of uninsured children. The share of uninsured children declines 
from 10.0 percent in 2009 to 9.7 percent in 2014 and 9.6 percent 
in 2019. Again, this reflects the movement of some uninsured 
children to Medicaid because of higher out-of-pocket costs.
Parents — In contrast to children, the number of parents who 
are uninsured increases substantially under each scenario  
(Figure 3). Parents experience significant losses in employer-
sponsored insurance. In the worst case scenario, the rate of 
ESI coverage falls from 64.8 percent in 2009 to 60.9 percent in 
2014 and 57.0 percent in 2019. Medicaid coverage expands from 
10.1 percent of the parent population in 2009 to 11.5 percent 
in 2014 and 12.9 percent in 2019. The relative increase is larger 
for parents than for children, because newly eligible adults are 
of lower income than newly eligible children and therefore 
have a higher take-up rate. The number of parents on Medicaid 
increases from 7.0 million in 2009 to 9.6 million in 2019. The 
number of uninsured increases from 12.5 million (18.0 percent) 
to 17.6 million (23.5 percent) in 2019. 
In the intermediate case, the rate of employer-sponsored 
insurance for parents declines, but less sharply than in the worst 
case scenario, because health care premiums grow more slowly, 
and the economy is better. Medicaid expands from 10.1 percent 
in 2009 to 12.2 percent in 2019, offsetting some of the loss 
of employer coverage. Nonetheless, the number of uninsured 
parents continues to increase from 12.5 million (18.0 percent) 
in 2009 to 15.0 million (20.6 percent) in 2014 and 16.5 million 
(22.2 percent) in 2019. 
In the best case, the percentage of parents with employer-
sponsored insurance continues to decline, although the 
absolute numbers stay relatively stable because of population 
growth. Medicaid continues to expand from 10.1 percent of the 
population to 10.8 percent in 2014 and 11.5 percent in 2019. The 
number of uninsured increased from 12.5 million in 2009 to 13.6 
million in 2014 and 14.5 million in 2019 (from 18.0 percent in 
2009 to 19.8 percent in 2019). 
Non-Parents — The greatest changes in coverage are for non-
parents, both because they tend to be lower income and because 
it is much harder for non-parents to become enrolled in Medicaid 
(Figure 4). In the worst case, the rate of employer-sponsored 
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52.6 percent in 2014 and 49.2 percent in 2019. Non-parents also 
have a substantial loss in non-group coverage, which declines 
from 7.5 percent of the population to 5.5 percent in 2014 and 
4.6 percent in 2019. Non-parents tend to have significantly lower 
incomes than parents, thus they are more responsive to the rising 
price of non-group coverage. There is a relatively small increase 
in Medicaid coverage, from 9.3 million in 2009 to 11.5 million 
in 2019. The result is that the number of uninsured non-parents 
increased from 28.7 million in 2009 to 34.1 million in 2014 and 
39.5 million in 2019. The percent uninsured increases from 24.1 
percent in 2009 to 32.0 percent in 2019. 
In the intermediate case non-parents also lose employer coverage, 
which declines from 55.6 percent in 2009 to 51.6 percent by 
2019. Non-group coverage also declines. Again, Medicaid picks 
up only some of this loss in private coverage. The number of 
non-parents without insurance increases from 28.7 million in 
2009 to 33.0 million in 2014 and 37.2 million in 2019. The 
percentage without coverage increases from 24.1 percent in 2009 
to 30.0 percent in 2019. 
In the best case scenario, non-parents continue to lose employer-
sponsored coverage, but not by as much as in the intermediate 
scenario. The number of non-parents with ESI actually increases 
slightly. Non-group coverage also declines, and Medicaid 
increases. In this scenario, the number of uninsured non-parents 
increases from 28.7 million (24.1 percent) in 2009 to 31.6 million 
(25.8 percent) in 2014 and 34.3 million (27.3 percent) in 2019. 
Thus, even in the best case scenario, there is a substantial loss of 
coverage among non-parents.
Results: Changes in Coverage by Income
In Table 7, we examine changes in coverage for three income 
groups, those below 200 percent of FPL, between 200 and 399 
percent of FPL and greater than 400 percent of FPL. Recall that 
we have assumed slower growth in income in the worst than in 
the intermediate and best cases from 2009 to 2019. As a result, 
there are greater increases in the low-income population relative 
to the middle- and higher-income populations in the worst 
case scenario and to a lesser degree in the intermediate case, 
compared to the best case scenario, over the entire period. In 
other words, the number and composition of individuals within 
each category varies across the scenarios. 
Low Income — Among the low-income population, there are 
small declines in employer coverage, notable declines in private 
non-group coverage, and significant increases in Medicaid. As a 
result, there is relatively little change in uninsured rates across  
all three scenarios. 
The low-income population has very low rates of employer-
sponsored insurance, 21.2 percent, in the baseline year 2009. In 
the worst case scenario, the percentage of low-income people 
with employer-sponsored insurance falls from 21.2 percent in 
2009 to 20.2 percent in 2014 and 20.4 percent in 2019. Because 
of the large growth in the low-income population in this 
scenario, there is an actual increase by 2019 of almost 4 million 
in the number of low-income people with employer-sponsored 
insurance. In contrast, rates of non-group insurance fall off quite 
dramatically, from 6.3 to 2.5 percent of the population over this 
time period. Medicaid grows substantially for the low-income 
population from 35.0 million in 2009 to 41.8 million in 2014 and 
47.9 million in 2019 (Figure 5). As a percentage of the population, 
Medicaid increases from 36.4 to 39.4 percent and then to 41.1 
percent. Because the large increase in Medicaid offsets the drop 
in private coverage, the percentage of the low-income population 
that is uninsured is virtually unchanged. In absolute numbers, 
the uninsured increases from 31.1 million to 34.9 million in 2014 
and 37.6 million in 2019, again because of the large growth in the 
low-income population. 
In the intermediate case, the percent of low-income people with 
ESI falls slightly, though there is an increase in the absolute 
number of low-income people with ESI. Non-group coverage 
again declines sharply. Medicaid increases significantly, from 
35.0 million in 2009 to 40.3 million in 2014 and 45.4 million 
in 2019. As a share of the population, Medicaid increases from 
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ESI Non-Group Medicaid Medicare Other Uninsured Total
N % FPL N % FPL N % FPL N % FPL N % FPL N % FPL N % FPL
Baseline
2009
<200% 20.3 21.2% 6.0 6.3% 35.0 36.4% 2.4 2.5% 1.2 1.3% 31.1 32.3% 96.1 100%
200-399% 50.6 65.5% 4.4 5.7% 7.1 9.1% 1.3 1.7% 1.4 1.8% 12.5 16.2% 77.3 100%
>400% 79.1 83.9% 5.4 5.7% 2.0 2.2% 0.8 0.8% 1.4 1.5% 5.5 5.8% 94.2 100%
Total 150.0 56.1% 15.8 5.9% 44.1 16.5% 4.5 1.7% 4.0 1.5% 49.1 18.4% 267.6 100%
Worst Case
2014
<200% 21.4 20.2% 3.9 3.7% 41.8 39.4% 2.6 2.5% 1.3 1.3% 34.9 32.9% 106.0 100%
200-399% 48.4 62.4% 3.7 4.8% 7.4 9.5% 1.2 1.6% 1.4 1.8% 15.4 19.8% 77.6 100%
>400% 75.4 81.8% 5.2 5.6% 2.0 2.2% 0.7 0.8% 1.4 1.5% 7.4 8.1% 92.2 100%
Total 145.2 52.7% 12.8 4.7% 51.2 18.6% 4.6 1.7% 4.2 1.5% 57.7 20.9% 275.7 100%
2019
<200% 23.8 20.4% 2.9 2.5% 47.9 41.1% 2.8 2.4% 1.5 1.3% 37.6 32.3% 116.4 100%
200-399% 46.6 59.1% 3.7 4.7% 7.7 9.7% 1.2 1.5% 1.4 1.8% 18.2 23.1% 78.8 100%
>400% 69.1 78.2% 5.5 6.3% 1.9 2.1% 0.7 0.7% 1.4 1.5% 9.9 11.2% 88.4 100%
Total 139.4 49.2% 12.2 4.3% 57.4 20.3% 4.6 1.6% 4.3 1.5% 65.7 23.2% 283.6 100%
Intermediate Case
2014
<200% 20.8 20.2% 4.1 3.9% 40.3 39.1% 2.6 2.5% 1.3 1.3% 34.0 33.0% 103.1 100%
200-399% 49.0 62.9% 3.8 4.8% 7.4 9.5% 1.2 1.6% 1.4 1.8% 15.1 19.3% 77.8 100%
>400% 78.3 82.6% 5.2 5.5% 2.1 2.2% 0.7 0.8% 1.5 1.6% 7.1 7.5% 94.8 100%
Total 148.1 53.7% 13.1 4.7% 49.7 18.0% 4.5 1.6% 4.2 1.5% 56.2 20.4% 275.7 100%
2019
<200% 22.7 20.3% 3.1 2.7% 45.4 40.6% 2.7 2.4% 1.4 1.3% 36.5 32.7% 111.7 100%
200-399% 46.8 60.7% 3.5 4.5% 7.4 9.6% 1.2 1.5% 1.4 1.8% 16.8 21.8% 77.1 100%
>400% 76.3 80.5% 5.4 5.7% 2.0 2.1% 0.7 0.7% 1.5 1.6% 8.9 9.4% 94.8 100%
Total 145.7 51.4% 12.0 4.2% 54.9 19.3% 4.5 1.6% 4.3 1.5% 62.2 21.9% 283.6 100%
Best Case
2014
<200% 20.4 20.3% 4.6 4.6% 38.9 38.6% 2.5 2.5% 1.3 1.3% 33.0 32.7% 100.7 100%
200-399% 49.9 64.4% 3.9 5.0% 7.3 9.4% 1.2 1.6% 1.4 1.8% 13.8 17.9% 77.4 100%
>400% 81.6 83.6% 5.4 5.5% 2.1 2.2% 0.8 0.8% 1.5 1.5% 6.3 6.4% 97.6 100%
Total 151.9 55.1% 13.8 5.0% 48.3 17.5% 4.5 1.6% 4.1 1.5% 53.1 19.3% 275.7 100%
2019
<200% 21.6 20.2% 3.9 3.6% 42.5 39.9% 2.6 2.4% 1.4 1.3% 34.7 32.5% 106.6 100%
200-399% 48.5 63.2% 3.6 4.7% 7.2 9.4% 1.2 1.5% 1.4 1.8% 14.8 19.3% 76.7 100%
>400% 82.9 82.6% 5.5 5.5% 2.1 2.1% 0.8 0.8% 1.5 1.5% 7.5 7.4% 100.3 100%
Total 153.0 53.9% 13.0 4.6% 51.9 18.3% 4.5 1.6% 4.3 1.5% 57.0 20.1% 283.6 100%
Source: Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model.
Table 7: Changes in Coverage Across Years Non-Elderly Population by Income (in millions)
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36.4 percent in 2009 to 40.6 percent in 2019. The percent of the 
low-income population that is uninsured increases slightly; the 
number of uninsured increases from 31.1 million in 2009 to 34.0 
million in 2014 and 36.5 million in 2019. 
In the best case scenario, again, employer-sponsored insurance 
declines slightly in percentage terms; non-group coverage also 
declines. Medicaid increases, but not as much as in the more 
pessimistic scenarios. The uninsured increase slightly as a share 
of the population, but significantly in absolute numbers. The 
number of low-income people who are uninsured increases from 
31.1 million in 2009 to 33.0 million in 2014 and 34.7 million 2019. 
Moderate Income — The largest effects if there is no health reform 
will be on middle-income groups, who have less access to public 
coverage with which to offset losses in private coverage. In the 
worst case, employer-sponsored insurance declines as a share of 
the middle-income population as well as in absolute number. 
The share with employer-sponsored insurance declines from 65.5 
percent in 2009 to 62.4 percent in 2014 and 59.1 percent in 2019. 
Non-group coverage declines by about one percentage point over 
the period. Medicaid increases only slightly, because relatively 
few people in this income range are eligible under current rules. 
The percentage of the middle-income group without insurance 
increases sharply from 16.2 percent in 2009 to 19.8 percent in 
2014 and 23.1 percent in 2019 (Figure 6). In absolute numbers, 
the uninsured increased from 12.5 million in 2009 to 15.4 
million in 2014 and 18.2 million in 2019, an increase of 6.9 
percentage points over the 10-year period. 
In the intermediate case, employer coverage declines, but by not 
as much as in the worst case. The percent with ESI declines from 
65.5 percent in 2009 to 62.9 percent in 2014 and 60.7 percent in 
2019. Non-group coverage falls as well, but again, by not as much 
as in the worst case, and Medicaid increases slightly. Even in the 
intermediate case, the percentage who are uninsured increases 
substantially from 16.2 percent in 2009 to 19.3 percent in 2014 
and 21.8 percent in 2019. In absolute number, the uninsured 
increases from 12.5 million in 2009 to 15.1 million in 2014 and 
16.8 million in 2019. 
In the best case, there is again less of a decline in employer-
sponsored insurance. The absolute number of those with ESI 
declines from 50.6 million to 48.5 million in 2019. The number 
with non-group coverage declines from 4.4 million to 3.6 
million. There was virtually no change in Medicaid. But because 
of the decline in employer-sponsored insurance, the number of 
uninsured increases from 12.5 million in 2009 to 14.8 million in 
2019; the percent uninsured increases from 16.2 to 19.3 percent 
in 2019.
High Income — Among those above 400 percent of poverty, the 
number of uninsured increases in each scenario. In the worst 
case, the ESI rate for the highest-income group falls from 83.9 
percent in 2009 to 78.2 percent by 2019. The share with non-
group increases slightly in 2019. As many firms stop offering ESI, 
some of those with high incomes switch to non-group coverage. 
The share of uninsured increases from 5.8 percent in 2009 to 
8.1 percent in 2014 and 11.2 percent in 2019; the number of 
uninsured increases from 5.5 million in 2009 to 7.4 million in 
2014 and 9.9 million in 2019 (Figure 7). 
In the intermediate case, the share of high-income people 
without insurance also increases substantially. Along with the 
decline in employer-sponsored insurance of three percentage 
points over the 10-year period, the share without coverage 
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increases to 9.4 percent in 2019. In the best case scenario, the 
decline in ESI is relatively small, but the number of uninsured 
still increases. The share of the high-income population 
uninsured increases to 6.4 percent in 2014 and 7.4 percent in 
2019; the number of uninsured in this income group increases 
to 6.3 million in 2014 and 7.5 million in 2019. Thus, the higher-
income groups have substantial declines in ESI and growth 
in the number of uninsured, particularly in the worst and 
intermediate cases. 
Results: Changes in Aggregate Spending
Table 8 summarizes our estimates of changes in spending by 
different payers in the health care system. Results are presented 
for each of the three scenarios. 
Medicaid and CHIP Spending — In the worst case scenario, 
Medicaid and CHIP spending would increase by 45.9 percent 
between 2009 and 2014 and a full 106.8 percent between 2009 
and 2019. Medicaid spending on the non-elderly would increase 
from $251.2 billion to $366.5 billion in 2014 and $519.7 billion 
in 2019. In the worst case, the growth in spending is due to the 
large increase in Medicaid enrollment, as well as the assumption 
of faster growth in Medicaid costs per enrollee (Figure 8).
Because the increase in Medicaid enrollment and growth in 
per-enrollee costs are lower than in the intermediate case, the 
increase in government spending is lower as well. Medicaid 
spending would increase to $341.6 billion in 2014 and to $458.4 
billion in 2019; these are increases of 36.0 percent between 2009 
and 2014, and 82.4 percent overall across the 10-year period. 
In the best case, Medicaid spending would increase by 27.5 
percent between 2009 and 2014, and 60.7 percent over the 
entire 10-year period and reach $403.8 billion in 2019. Medicaid 
spending is lower in the best case, because there is even less of 
an increase in Medicaid enrollment, and health care costs are 
assumed to grow at a slower rate. 
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% change  
2014-2019
% change  
2009-2019
Worst Case
Medicaid/CHIP Spending $251.2 $366.5 45.9% $519.7 41.8% 106.8%
Uncompensated Care Costs $62.1 $92.3 48.7% $141.4 53.2% 127.8%
Employer Premium Spending $429.8 $624.7 45.3% $885.1 41.7% 105.9%
Individual and Family Spending $326.4 $416.9 27.7% $548.4 31.6% 68.0%
Intermediate Case
Medicaid/CHIP Spending $251.2 $341.6 36.0% $458.4 34.2% 82.4%
Uncompensated Care Costs $62.1 $87.0 40.1% $123.1 41.5% 98.3%
Employer Premium Spending $429.8 $610.5 42.0% $847.3 38.8% 97.2%
Individual and Family Spending $326.4 $408.3 25.1% $521.3 27.7% 59.7%
Best Case
Medicaid/CHIP Spending $251.2 $320.4 27.5% $403.8 26.1% 60.7%
Uncompensated Care Costs $62.1 $81.0 30.4% $106.6 31.6% 71.7%
Employer Premium Spending $429.8 $572.9 33.3% $740.6 29.3% 72.3%
Individual and Family Spending $326.4 $392.3 20.2% $476.2 21.4% 45.9%
Source: Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model.
Note: Individual and Family Spending includes out-of-pocket health care costs and premiums.
Table 8: Aggregate Spending Across Years Non-Elderly Population
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Uncompensated care costs also increase substantially under 
each of the three scenarios. In the worst case, the costs of 
uncompensated care increase from $62.1 billion in 2009 to $92.3 
billion in 2014 and then to $141.4 billion in 2019, an increase of 
127.8 percent. The significant increases reflect the large increase 
in the uninsured and the growth in health care costs. In the 
intermediate case, the cost of uncompensated care grows by 40.1 
percent by 2014. Between 2014 and 2019 there is another 41.5 
percent growth in spending, and the cost of uncompensated care 
reaches $123.1 billion, again because the number of uninsured 
and health care costs increase (Figure 9). 
In the best case, uncompensated care increases from $62.1 
billion in 2009 to $81.0 billion in 2014. There are fewer 
uninsured and less of an increase in health care costs. By 2019, 
uncompensated care, even in the best case, will rise to $106.6 
billion, or a 72 percent increase over the levels seen in 2009. 
Obviously this will be a burden to all levels of government and 
could also have a small effect on private premiums. 
Employers — Employer spending34 on health insurance premiums 
increases dramatically. In the worst case, employer spending on 
health care premiums would increase from $429.8 billion in 2009 
to $624.7 billion in 2014, an increase of 45.3 percent, and then 
increase to $885.1 billion in 2019. Over the entire 10-year period, 
employer spending on premiums will more than double. The 
growth in premiums swamps the decline in the number of people 
with employer coverage. The growth in employer premiums 
could obviously be offset by reducing benefits and increasing 
cost sharing, but this would increase the growth in individual 
and family spending discussed in the next section. 
In the intermediate case, employer spending will increase from 
$429.8 billion in 2009 to $610.5 billion in 2014, an increase  
of 42.0 percent. Over the entire period, employer spending  
will increase to $847.3 billion, or by 97.2 percent. The increase  
in employer spending is less than in the worst case, despite  
the fact that there are more people with employer coverage, 
because health care costs and premium growth are assumed  
to be lower (Figure 10). 
In the best case, employer spending increases from $429.8 billion 
in 2009 to $572.9 billion in 2014, an increase of 33.3 percent. 
Employer spending reaches $740.6 billion in 2019, an increase of 
72.3 percent from 2009. This is lower than in the intermediate 
case because more people keep their employer coverage and 
health care costs are assumed to be lower. Thus the difference in 
employer spending between the worst and best case scenarios is 
muted, because there is less employer-sponsored insurance in the 
worst case, but health care costs grow more slowly in the best case.
Individuals and Families — Spending by individuals and families 
also increases substantially over the 10-year period under all 
three scenarios. This includes spending on the employee share  
of premiums, spending on non-group premiums by those who 
take that form of coverage and out-of-pocket spending on 
medical services. In the worst case, between 2009 and 2014 
individual spending will increase by 27.7 percent, from $326.4 
billion to $416.9 billion. Individual and family spending 
increases to $548.4 billion in 2019, an increase of 68.0 percent 
compared with 2009. The relative increase in spending by 
individuals is lower than for government programs and employer 
coverage under this scenario, because large numbers of people 
become uninsured (where spending levels are lower) or enroll 
in Medicaid (where there are no or little out-of-pocket costs for 
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Figure 9:  Change in Spending on Uncompensated Care 
For the Uninsured 2009-2019 (in billions)
Best Case Worst Case
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Figure 8:  Change in Medicaid/CHIP Spending for Acute 
Care, Non-Elderly 2009-2019 (in billions)
Best Case Worst Case
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In the intermediate case, individual and family spending 
increases by 25.1 percent between 2009 and 2014, and by another 
27.7 percent between 2014 and 2019. Individual and family 
spending is lower in the intermediate case than in the worst 
case, because health care costs grow more slowly. In the best 
case, individual and family spending increases by 20.2 percent 
between 2009 and 2014, and by 45.9 percent over the entire 
period. Spending growth is lower because health care costs are 
assumed to grow more slowly than under the prior two scenarios. 
Nonetheless, even the best case results suggest individuals and 
families will face sizable increases in out-of-pocket spending, 
along with higher taxes to support higher government health 
care spending. 
Results: Medicaid/CHIP and Uncompensated Care 
Table 9 presents more detailed information on Medicaid/
CHIP expenditures and uncompensated care. In the worst case, 
Medicaid spending per non-elderly enrollee increases by 58.8 
percent over the entire period. Using aggregate personal income 
(based on CPS income, including income of people age 65 and 
over) as a proxy for the aggregate tax base, we express Medicaid 
spending as a share of this total income measure.35 As a share 
of income, Medicaid spending increases from 3.0 to 5.0 percent 
in 2019, a 68.6 percent increase in Medicaid spending relative 
to aggregate incomes. In other words, in the worst case, the 
tax burden from funding Medicaid and CHIP over the 10-year 
period will increase by 68.6 percent. Uncompensated care  
also increases as a share of income, from 0.7 to 1.4 percent.  
The increase in uncompensated care spending as a share of 
income increases 85.6 percent over the period.
In the intermediate case, Medicaid spending growth is somewhat 
slower, because there are fewer people enrolled in Medicaid, and 
health care costs grow at a slower rate. As a share of income, 
Medicaid spending increases from 3.0 to 4.2 percent over 10 
years, a 42.1 percent increase. Uncompensated care costs grow 
from 0.7 percent of income to 1.1 percent in 2019, a 54.5 percent 
increase over the period. In the best case scenario, Medicaid 
spending increases by less than in the previous scenario because 
of fewer enrollees. Medicaid and CHIP spending increases as a 
share of income from 3.0 to 3.5 percent, slightly less than a 20 
percent increase over the period. Uncompensated care as a share 
of income increases from 0.7 to 0.9 percent. 
Between Medicaid/CHIP and uncompensated care costs, 
spending increases substantially as a share of income per capita 
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Figure 10:  Employer Spending on Premiums 2009-2019 
(in billions)













2009 2014 2019 
Individual and Family Spending 
2009-2019 
(in billions) 
Best Case Worst Case 
Figure 11 
Figure 11:  Individual and Family Spending 2009-2019 
(in billions)
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Figure 12:  Medicaid/CHIP Spending and Uncompensated 
Care Costs as a Share of Income 2009-2019 
(as percent of aggregate incomes)
Best Case Worst Case
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is less than projected because of budgetary reasons, Medicaid 
enrollment will grow at a slower rate, and the number of 
uninsured will increase more rapidly. While Medicaid and  
CHIP spending as a share of per capita income will be slower,  
the burden of uncompensated care will be greater.
Results: Employer Spending on Health Insurance  
Premiums 
In Table 10, we examine the increases in premium costs per 
worker (Figure 13), as well as premiums as a share of worker 
compensation—specifically, premiums divided by wages plus 
premiums. This measure shows the increases in premiums as 
a share of overall compensation. Thus, as premiums grow as a 
share of compensation, the share that is wage growth must be 
slower by definition. In the model, the wage adjustment takes 
place instantaneously; in all likelihood the adjustment would 
take a period of time during which business profitability would 
be adversely affected. 
The worst case scenario shows that premium outlays would 
increase by 105.9 percent over the 10-year period, and premiums 
per worker by 119.6 percent; the latter is slightly greater than the 
growth in aggregate premiums, because of a reduction in the 
number of covered workers. Employer premiums increase from 
9.6 percent of worker compensation in 2009 to 12.9 percent in 
2014, and then to 17.0 percent in 2019. 
Firms of all sizes see large increases in premium costs per worker. 
In the worst case, aggregate premiums grow more slowly than 
premiums per worker, because there is a larger drop in coverage 
in small firms. Over the 10-year period, total premiums increase 
by 44.0 percent for small firms, while premiums per worker grow 
2009 2014
% change  
2009-2014
2019
% change  
2014-2019
% change  
2009-2019
Worst Case
Medicaid/CHIP (in billlions) $251.2 $366.5 45.9% $519.7 41.8% 106.8%
Spending per enrollee $5,697 $7,159 25.7% $9,046 26.4% 58.8%
Spending as a share of total income 3.0% 3.9% 32.5% 5.0% 27.2% 68.6%
Uncompensated Care Costs (in billions) $62.1 $92.3 48.7% $141.4 53.2% 127.8%
Spending as a share of total income 0.7% 1.0% 35.1% 1.4% 37.4% 85.6%
Intermediate Case
Medicaid/CHIP (in billions) $251.2 $341.6 36.0% $458.4 34.2% 82.4%
Spending per enrollee $5,697 $6,868 20.5% $8,355 21.7% 46.7%
Spending as a share of total income 3.0% 3.6% 20.4% 4.2% 18.0% 42.1%
Uncompensated Care Costs (in billions) $62.1 $87.0 40.1% $123.1 41.5% 98.3%
Spending as a share of total income 0.7% 0.9% 24.1% 1.1% 24.5% 54.5%
Best Case
Medicaid/CHIP (in billions) $251.2 $320.4 27.5% $403.8 26.1% 60.7%
Spending per enrollee $5,697 $6,635 16.5% $7,787 17.3% 36.7%
Spending as a share of total income 3.0% 3.3% 9.9% 3.5% 8.5% 19.2%
Uncompensated Care Costs (in billions) $62.1 $81.0 30.4% $106.6 31.6% 71.7%
Spending as a share of total income 0.7% 0.8% 12.4% 0.9% 13.3% 27.3%
Source: Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model.
Note: Total income is aggregate personal income from the CPS with applicable inflation and including the population age 65 and over.
Table 9: Medicaid/CHIP and Uncompensated Care Spending Across Years Non-Elderly Population
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Total Premium Spending (in billions) $429.8 $624.7 45.3% $885.1 41.7% 105.9%
Premiums per worker $5,884 $8,807 49.7% $12,921 46.7% 119.6%
Premiums as a share of worker compensation 9.6% 12.9% 34.8% 17.0% 31.8% 77.7%
Small Firms*
Total Premium Spending (in billions) $82.0 $100.5 22.6% $118.1 17.5% 44.0%
Premiums per worker $5,921 $8,735 47.5% $12,654 44.9% 113.7%
Premiums as a share of worker compensation 10.9% 14.5% 32.5% 18.6% 29.0% 70.9%
Medium Firms*
Total Premium Spending (in billions) $121.3 $181.4 49.6% $261.2 44.0% 115.5%
Premiums per worker $5,584 $8,392 50.3% $12,371 47.4% 121.5%
Premiums as a share of worker compensation 9.5% 12.9% 36.2% 17.2% 32.7% 80.8%
Large Firms*
Total Premium Spending (in billions) $226.5 $342.7 51.3% $505.7 47.6% 123.3%
Premiums per worker $6,045 $9,065 50.0% $13,293 46.6% 119.9%
Premiums as a share of worker compensation 9.2% 12.5% 35.8% 16.6% 32.7% 80.3%
Intermediate Case
All Firms
Total Premium Spending (in billions) $429.8 $610.5 42.0% $847.3 38.8% 97.2%
Premiums per worker $5,884 $8,395 42.7% $11,756 40.0% 99.8%
Premiums as a share of worker compensation 9.6% 12.2% 27.6% 15.3% 24.8% 59.3%
Small Firms*
Total Premium Spending (in billions) $82.0 $100.5 22.6% $120.6 20.0% 47.1%
Premiums per worker $5,921 $8,363 41.2% $11,557 38.2% 95.2%
Premiums as a share of worker compensation 10.9% 13.7% 25.6% 16.8% 22.7% 54.2%
Medium Firms*
Total Premium Spending (in billions) $121.3 $176.2 45.3% $245.8 39.5% 102.7%
Premiums per worker $5,584 $7,995 43.2% $11,215 40.3% 100.8%
Premiums as a share of worker compensation 9.5% 12.2% 28.9% 15.3% 25.4% 61.6%
Large Firms*
Total Premium Spending (in billions) $226.5 $333.7 47.3% $480.9 44.1% 112.3%
Premiums per worker $6,045 $8,633 42.8% $12,107 40.2% 100.3%
Premiums as a share of worker compensation 9.2% 11.8% 28.4% 14.9% 25.6% 61.4%
Best Case
All Firms
Total Premium Spending (in billions) $429.8 $572.9 33.3% $740.6 29.3% 72.3%
Premiums per worker $5,884 $7,552 28.3% $9,628 27.5% 63.6%
Premiums as a share of worker compensation 9.6% 11.0% 15.2% 12.6% 13.9% 31.2%
Small Firms*
Total Premium Spending (in billions) $82.0 $103.2 25.9% $126.3 22.3% 53.9%
Premiums per worker $5,921 $7,575 27.9% $9,602 26.8% 62.2%
Premiums as a share of worker compensation 10.9% 12.4% 14.0% 14.0% 12.6% 28.3%
Medium Firms*
Total Premium Spending (in billions) $121.3 $162.8 34.3% $212.9 30.8% 75.6%
Premiums per worker $5,584 $7,182 28.6% $9,166 27.6% 64.2%
Premiums as a share of worker compensation 9.5% 11.0% 15.9% 12.6% 14.3% 32.4%
Large Firms*
Total Premium Spending (in billions) $226.5 $306.8 35.4% $401.4 30.8% 77.2%
Premiums per worker $6,045 $7,757 28.3% $9,902 27.7% 63.8%
Premiums as a share of worker compensation 9.2% 10.6% 15.6% 12.2% 14.3% 32.1%
Source: Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model.
Cost as a share of worker compensation refers to the premium cost divided by worker compensation, which is the sum of wages and employer share of premium costs, for policyholders.
Cost per worker is also calculated from the policyholders within firms.
Premiums per worker include employer spending on dependents.
*Small Firms include firms with 1-49 employees; Medium Firms include firms with 50-999 employees; Large Firms include firms with 1,000+ employees.
Table 10: Employer Spending Across Years Non-elderly Population
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at 113.7 percent. For covered workers, premiums as a share of 
worker compensation increase from 10.9 percent in 2009, to 18.6 
percent in 2019. For large firms, total premiums increase slightly 
faster than premiums per worker because of small increases in 
covered workers. Premiums increase as a share of compensation 
from 9.2 to 16.6 percent. 
In the intermediate case, employer premiums increase by 
somewhat less than in the worst case because, despite the fact 
that more individuals retain employer coverage, health care costs 
are assumed to grow at a slower rate. Nonetheless, aggregate 
employer spending on premiums increases by 97.2 percent 
over the 10-year period, from $429.8 billion in 2009 to $610.5 
billion 2014 and $847.3 billion in 2019. Employer spending on 
premiums as a share of worker compensation increases from 9.6 
percent in 2009 to 15.3 percent in 2019 (Figure 14). 
Premium spending by small firms increases at a relatively slow 
rate because there is, again, more dropping of coverage in small 
firms than in larger firms. But, even for firms with fewer than 
50 workers, spending on employer premiums increases from 
$82.0 billion in 2009 to $120.6 billion in 2019, an increase of 47 
percent. Premiums as a share of worker compensation increases 
from 10.9 percent in 2009 to 16.8 percent in 2019. Large firms 
would see spending on premiums increase from $226.5 billion in 
2009 to $480.9 billion in 2019, a more than doubling of premium 
expenditures. As a share of worker compensation, premiums 
would increase from 9.2 to 14.9 percent over the 10-year period. 
In the best case scenario (lower unemployment, faster income 
growth, and slower health care costs growth), aggregate employer 
premiums still increase by 72.3 percent over the 10-year period. 
Employers would see premium increases from $429.8 billion 
to $740.6 billion. Premiums as a share of worker compensation 
would increase from 9.6 to 12.6 percent. Spending increases for 
small firms are somewhat higher than in the previous scenarios 
because more workers retain employer coverage. Aggregate 
premiums would increase by 53.9 percent. Premiums as a share of 
compensation would increase from 10.9 to 14.0 percent. In large 
firms, premiums would increase from $226.5 billion in 2009 to 
$401.4 billion in 2019, slightly less than a doubling of premium 
spending by larger firms. Aggregate premiums increase faster 
than premiums per worker, because more people are covered in 
large firms. Premiums as a share of worker compensation would 
increase from 9.2 to 12.2 percent over the 10-year period. 
One implication of the substantial increases in premiums in each 
of these scenarios is that the cost to government of the current 
exclusion of employer premiums. from both payroll and income 
taxation, would increase as a growing share of compensation 
is devoted to health insurance premiums. If we assume that 
marginal tax rates would stay roughly the same, then the amount 
of revenue loss due to the tax exclusion will approximately 
double in the worst case scenario and increase by 72.3 percent in 
the best case scenario over the 10-year period. The value of the 
tax exclusion in 2007 was $246 billion.36
Results: Individual and Family Spending 
Table 11 shows the changes in individual and family spending for 
health insurance premiums and direct spending for medical care 
services. As noted earlier, total individual and family spending 
on premiums and out-of-pocket costs increase by 68.0 percent 
in the worst case, 59.7 percent in the intermediate case and 45.9 
percent in the best case. Spending per person also increases 
faster in the worst case than in the intermediate and best cases. 
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All Individual and Family Spending (in billions) $326.4 $416.9 27.7% $548.4 31.6% 68.0%
Spending per person $1,220 $1,512 23.9% $1,934 27.9% 58.5%
Spending as a share of income 4.5% 5.2% 17.3% 6.3% 19.9% 40.7%
Aggregate Spending for <200% (in billions) $57.5 $67.2 16.9% $82.4 22.6% 43.3%
Spending per person $599 $634 5.8% $708 11.6% 18.1%
Spending as a share of income 8.6% 8.7% 0.2% 9.0% 3.4% 3.6%
Aggregate Spending for 200%-399% (in billions) $99.2 $127.6 28.6% $171.2 34.2% 72.6%
Spending per person $1,283 $1,644 28.2% $2,172 32.1% 69.3%
Spending as a share of income 6.0% 7.0% 17.1% 8.3% 18.9% 39.3%
Aggregate Spending for 400% + (in billions) $169.7 $222.1 30.9% $294.8 32.7% 73.7%
Spending per person $1,800 $2,410 33.9% $3,335 38.4% 85.3%
Spending as a share of income 3.4% 4.1% 21.7% 5.1% 23.6% 50.5%
Intermediate Case
All Individual and Family Spending (in billions) $326.4 $408.3 25.1% $521.3 27.7% 59.7%
Spending per person $1,220 $1,481 21.4% $1,838 24.1% 50.7%
Spending as a share of income 4.5% 5.0% 12.6% 5.7% 14.6% 29.1%
Aggregate Spending for <200% (in billions) $57.5 $65.1 13.3% $77.3 18.8% 34.6%
Spending per person $599 $632 5.4% $692 9.6% 15.5%
Spending as a share of income 8.6% 8.7% 0.4% 8.8% 1.7% 2.1%
Aggregate Spending for 200%-399% (in billions) $99.2 $124.2 25.2% $156.2 25.8% 57.4%
Spending per person $1,283 $1,595 24.4% $2,025 26.9% 57.8%
Spending as a share of income 6.0% 6.8% 13.5% 7.8% 14.5% 30.0%
Aggregate Spending for 400% + (in billions) $169.7 $219.1 29.1% $287.9 31.4% 69.6%
Spending per person $1,800 $2,310 28.4% $3,037 31.5% 68.8%
Spending as a share of income 3.4% 3.9% 16.2% 4.6% 18.2% 37.3%
Best Case
All Individual and Family Spending (in billions) $326.4 $392.3 20.2% $476.2 21.4% 45.9%
Spending per person $1,220 $1,423 16.6% $1,679 18.0% 37.6%
Spending as a share of income 4.5% 4.7% 5.6% 5.0% 7.3% 13.3%
Aggregate Spending for <200% (in billions) $57.5 $63.7 10.9% $72.7 14.1% 26.6%
Spending per person $599 $633 5.7% $683 7.8% 14.0%
Spending as a share of income 8.6% 8.7% 0.3% 8.8% 1.1% 1.4%
Aggregate Spending for 200%-399% (in billions) $99.2 $117.9 18.8% $139.6 18.4% 40.7%
Spending per person $1,283 $1,522 18.7% $1,819 19.5% 41.8%
Spending as a share of income 6.0% 6.5% 7.8% 7.0% 7.8% 16.2%
Aggregate Spending for 400% + (in billions) $169.7 $210.6 24.1% $263.8 25.3% 55.5%
Spending per person $1,800 $2,158 19.9% $2,630 21.9% 46.1%
Spending as a share of income 3.4% 3.6% 7.5% 4.0% 9.6% 17.9%
Source: Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model.
Note: To compute spending per person, we divide the total spending within each population group by the total personal income of people in the same population group.
Table 11: Individual and Family Spending Across Years Non-Elderly Population
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population increases in the worst case from 4.5 percent in 2009 
to 6.3 percent in 2019. In the best case, spending as a share of 
income increases from 4.5 to 5.0 percent. These changes amount 
to increases in individual and family spending as a share of 
income of 40.7 percent in the worst case and 13.3 percent in the 
best case over 10 years (Figure 15).
Among low-income people, aggregate spending over 10 years 
increases by 43.3 percent in the worst case, 34.6 percent in the 
intermediate case and 26.6 percent in the best case. Spending 
per person grows relatively slowly for low-income people, in part 
because many move to Medicaid or become uninsured. Spending 
as a share of income (i.e., personal income of those within each 
income category), increases slowly over the 10-year period from 
8.6 percent in 2009 to 9.0 percent in the worst case, an increase 
of 3.4 percent, and to 8.8 percent in the best case scenario, an 
increase of 1.1 percent. Spending as a share of income grows 
slowly because the low-income population is growing in each 
scenario, but those falling below 200 percent of FPL have higher 
incomes that the average person in that income category.
For middle- and higher-income people, individual/family 
spending increases substantially faster, both in the aggregate and 
on a per capita basis. In the worst case, spending as a share of 
income, for example, increases for the highest-income group by 
50.5 percent, from 3.4 percent in 2009 to 5.1 percent in 2019. In 
the intermediate case, spending as a share of income increases 
by 37.3 percent, from 3.4 percent in 2009 to 4.6 percent in 2019. 
In the best case, spending as a share of income increases by 17.9 
percent, from 3.4 percent of income in 2009 to 4.0 percent of 
income in 2019. 
The results suggest that individual and family out-of-pocket 
spending will increase at fairly significant rates for most of the 
population. These populations will also face higher taxes to 
support Medicaid and uncompensated care–spending that is not 
taken into account here. And as we have shown, premiums will 
grow as a share of overall compensation, thus income growth will 
be adversely affected, and overall family financial burdens will 
increase significantly. 
Conclusion
This paper has focused on the changes in coverage and health 
care spending that are likely to happen in the absence of health 
reform. Clearly health reform will also increase health care 
spending as we pay for coverage expansions. This will certainly 
be true in the early years as many individuals are newly covered 
and they and others are provided with subsidies to make 
insurance affordable. Hopefully over time cost containment 
efforts will be successful and reduce or eliminate any increment 
to expenditures resulting from the coverage expansion. 
Nonetheless, it is likely to remain true that health care costs 
could be higher than under the current system for a long time. 
Health reform will, however, change coverage dramatically. It is 
likely that more people will be covered through Medicaid and 
CHIP, fewer by employers, and that the number of uninsured 
would be largely eliminated. A successful health care reform 
would help with a wide range of other problems, including 
the financial pressures on hospitals and clinics that serve the 
uninsured, as well as with the high premium costs faced by 
businesses. Individuals and families that face the threat of 
high health care costs will see increases in financial security 
and hopefully improved health. Health care reform will also 
change who pays for health care and how the financial burdens 
are shared between employers and individuals, between direct 
payments and taxes, and across income groups.
But health reform will no doubt prove hard to enact. There are 
many issues in dispute that could cause health reform efforts to 
fail. This paper provides evidence that there will also be a large 
cost to failure. Predicting the future is always difficult, thus we 
have used three alternative scenarios with varying assumptions 
on the course of the economy and health care costs. In general 
the results show that the number of uninsured will increase 
substantially, particularly among middle- and higher-income 
individuals and among adults–both parents and non-parents. 
Medicaid enrollment is likely to grow substantially. Our 
estimates are based on current Medicaid eligibility standards. 
Medicaid enrollment will grow more slowly if states can’t afford 
to pay their share and reduce coverage, but this would mean that 
the number of uninsured could be significantly higher than we 
have estimated.
Employers will face substantial increases in premiums; these 
eventually will get shifted to workers in the form of lower 
wages. The shift of premium costs onto labor takes time; in 
the interim, business profitability will be adversely affected. 
Higher employer premiums will also affect federal tax revenues, 
because they are currently excluded from income and payroll 
taxes. Individuals and families will face increased spending for 
their share of premiums and out-of-pocket costs. To the extent 
employers reduce the scope of benefits and/or increase cost 
sharing, individuals and families would bear more of the burden 
than we have suggested, and employers less. We conclude that 
stakeholders and policymakers need to be aware that the cost of 
failing to enact health reform is high.
1 Bureau of Economic Analysis. National Income and Products Accounts Tables, 
Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product, Annual 1999-2008. Available at http://www.bea.gov/
national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp (accessed 22 April 2009); Center for Medicare and  
Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary. “National health expenditure aggregate, per  
capita, percent distribution, and annual percent change by source of funds: Calendar years 
1960-2007.” Data from the National Health Statistics Group. Available at http://www.cms. 
hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/02_NationalHealthAccounts Historical.asp  
(accessed 22 April 2009).
2 Sing M, Banthin JS, Selden TM, Cowan CA, Keehan SP. Reconciling Medical Expenditure 
Estimates from the MEPS and NHEA, 2002. Health Care Financing Review. 28:25-40, 2006.
3 Sherry Glied, Dahlia K. Remler, and Joshua Graff Zivin, “Inside the Sausage Factory: 
Improving Estimates of the Effects of Health Insurance Expansion Proposals.” Milbank 
Quarterly. 80(4):603-635, 2002.
4 The two studies used substantially different methods and data sources.
5 Gilmer, Todd and Richard Kronick. “It’s the Premiums, Stupid! Projections of the Uninsured 
through 2013.” Health Affairs, Web Exclusive, April 5, 2005.
6 Chernew, Michael, David Cutler, Patricia Keenan. “Increasing Health Insurance Costs and 
the Decline in Insurance Coverage.” Health Services Research. 40(4):1021-1039, 2005.
7 State Health Access Data Center, University of Minnesota. At the Brink: Trends in America’s 
Uninsured. March 2009.
8 Because HIPSM is a utility-based microsimulation model in which individuals, families, and 
firms make different decisions in response to price changes depending on their circumstances, 
it does not directly impose a particular elasticity value. Rather, we compute elasticities from 
the overall responses to changes in HIPSM, in this case the assumed changes in health care 
costs and incomes, for summary and comparison purposes. In addition, the overall behavioral 
effect is not fixed, but depends on the relative growth in income, insured health care costs, 
out-of-pocket health care costs, and premiums. The behavioral effects of premium growth 
on coverage, for example, are larger the more by which premium growth exceeds growth in 
underlying health care costs.
9 John Holahan and Bowen Garrett. “Rising Unemployment, Medicaid and the Uninsured.” 
Policy brief. Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.  
January 2009.
10 The Congressional Budget Office “A Preliminary Analysis of the President’s Budget and an 
Update of CBO’s Budget and Economic Outlook “March 2009; data obtained from Moody’s 
economy.com, April 2009. 
11 U.S. Census Bureau. Population Projections, Table 2a. Projected Population of the United 
States, by Age and Sex: 2000 to 2050. http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/
usinterimproj/natprojtab02a.pdf. 
12 Authors’ calculations from the 2008 Current Population Survey.
13 Holahan and Garrett 2009.
14 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary. “National Health 
Expenditure Projections 2008-2018, Forecast Summary and Selected Tables.” Available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/03_NationaHealthAccountsProjected.
asp (accessed 22 April 2009).
15 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary.
16 The Congressional Budget Office.
17 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary.
18 The Congressional Budget Office.
19 Moody’s Economy.com.
20 The exact relationship between the unemployment rate and employment to population ratio 
depends on the changes in the labor force (e.g., due to discouraged workers) and changes in the 
working-age population. The regression estimates the average relationship.
21 Moody’s Economy.com.
22 Authors’ calculations from the 2001 and 2008 Current Population Surveys.
23 Yellen, Janet, Economic inequality in the United States. Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco. FRBSF Economic Letter. 2006-33-34. Dec 1, 2006; Regev, Tali and Daniel Wilson., 
Changes in Income Inequality across the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank Of San Francisco.  
FRBSF Economic Letter. 2007-28. Sep 21, 2007.
24 Leonhardt, David, “Job Losses Show Breadth of Recession,” New York Times, 3 March 2009.
25 Moody’s Economy.com.
26 The Congressional Budget Office.
27 Moody’s economy.com.
28 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Studies, Office of the Actuary.
29 The Congressional Budget Office.
30 Kaiser HRET Survey of Employer Sponsored Health Benefits; Paul Ginsburg et al.; 
Tracking Health Care Costs: Continued Stability but at Higher Rates in 2005” Health Affairs. 
25(6):w486-w495, 2006.
31 John Holahan; Mindy Cohen and David Rousseau, “Why Did Medicaid Spending Decline 
in 2006?, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, October 2007.
32 Clemans-Cope, Lisa, and Bowen Garrett. “Changes in Employer-Sponsored Health 
Insurance Sponsorship, Eligibility, and Participation: 2001 to 2005.” Issue paper. Washington, 
DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. December 2006.
33 The CBO projects the number of uninsured will increase from 45 million in 2009 to 
54 million in 2019 (Congressional Budget Office. Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health 
Insurance Proposals, December 2008). The CBO number is lower in 2009 to start with because 
of differences in the data sources used and because, as the CBO points out, their estimate is 
not adjusted for the recent deterioration in economic conditions. The change in the number 
of uninsured estimated by the CBO of 9 million corresponds most closely to our best case 
scenario where the number of uninsured increased by 8 million.
34 Adding $283 billion in individual spending on ESI and non-group premiums in 2009 in 
the model to the $440 billion in employer premium spending, we get $723 in total premium 
spending. This is less than the projected $854 billion in premium spending in the National 
Health Expenditure Accounts (NHE) for three main reasons. Most importantly, because 
individuals can have only one type of coverage within HIPSM, we apply a hierarchy to the 
health insurance coverage reported in the CPS that places Medicaid and CHIP coverage before 
ESI coverage, and therefore reduces the number of people that are shown to have ESI. In 
addition, NHE includes premium payments made on behalf of institutionalized individuals 
that are not included in the scope of the CPS and MEPS (Sing et al.2006). Finally, premium 
costs made by or on behalf of individuals over age 64 are not included in the tables. These 
differences affect the levels but not the growth in ESI premiums.
35 Because of top-coding of CPS income, this measure does not include all the income of very 
high income individuals. However, in 2009 it totals to $8.5 trillion which is higher than the 
CBO’s estimate of the wages and salaries component of the tax base of about $6.6 trillion. In 
addition to wages and salaries, the CPS measure includes other sources of income including 
retirement and investment income. 
36 Joint Committee on Taxation, “Table 2. Calendar Year Employer Exclusion Tax Savings, 
2007,” Tax Expenditures for Health Care, 31 July 2008. Available at http://www.jct.
gov/x-66-08.pdf (accessed 23 April 2009); Joint Committee on Taxation, “Table 2. Tax 
Expenditure Estimates by Budget Function, Fiscal Years 2008-2012,” Estimates of Federal 
Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2008-2012, 31 October 2008. Available at http://jct.gov/
publications.html?func=startdown&id=1192 (accessed 23 April 2009).
Endnotes

